(1897) (“An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.”). For that reason, this Ofﬁce’s focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as deﬁned in federal law, not the commonly discussed term “collusion.” The Ofﬁce considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign ofﬁcials and Russia~linked individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy—either under statutes that have their own conspiracy language (e.g., l8 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1951(a)), or under the general conspiracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 371). The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume I, Section IV, supra, amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law—including foreign-inﬂuence and campaign-ﬁnance laws, both of which are discussed further below. The Ofﬁce therefore did not charge any individual associated with the Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either under a speciﬁc statute or under Section 371’s offenses clause. The Ofﬁce also did not charge any campaign ofﬁcial or associate with a conspiracy under Section 371’s defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the US. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means. See Dennis v. United States, 384 US. 855, 861 (1966); Hammerschmz'dt v. United States, 265 US. 182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign ofﬁcials— or between such ofﬁcials and Russia-linked individuals—to interfere with or obstruct a lawful function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. And, as discussed in Volume 1, Section V.A, supra, the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign ofﬁcial or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the Ofﬁce charged, namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume 1, Section II, supra. Accordingly, the Ofﬁce did not charge any Campaign associate or other US. person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section IV above. 2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951) The Ofﬁce next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-afﬁliated individuals under federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government. (1. Governing Law Under 18 U.S.C. § 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant must act on behalf of a foreign government (as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities), the acts need not involve espionage; rather, acts of any type sufﬁce for liability. See United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2010); UnitedStates v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 5 81 (7th Cir. 2005). An “agent of a foreign government” is an “individual” who “agrees to operate” in the United States “subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official.” 18 U.S.C. § 951(d).
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