Mueller Report Page 22 of 448

Text Translation

II. RUSSIAN “ACTIVE MEASURES” SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN

The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research
Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and
companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord
Catering (collectively “Concord”).2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large
U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system.3 These operations
constituted “active measures” (aKTPIBHLIC Meponpnn'rna), a term that typically refers to operations
conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairsfl‘

The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014.
Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages
designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S.
political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these
social media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to
the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and
photographs for use in their social media posts.

IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016
U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump
Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry
out those activities, including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S.
persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their
Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump
Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities, including the
staging of political rallies.5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons
knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA’s interference operation.

By the end of the 2016 U.S. election, the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S.
persons through their social media accounts. Multiple IRA~controlled Facebook groupsand

2 The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures
operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports,
and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI.

3Harm to Ongoing Matter
see also SM-2230634, serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numbers

identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains
additional law enforcement sensitive information.

4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges
against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principally for conspiracy to defraud the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Volume 1, Section VA, infia; Indictment, United States
v. Internet Research Agency, at al., 1:18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. 1 (“Internet Research Agency
Indictment”).

5 Internet Research A enc Indictment | l 52, 54, 55 a , 56 74' Harm t0 031901119

FAQ

Where is this data from?

We have run image and text processing on the all 448 pages of the original Mueller Report PDF Image to make it searchable. Text translations are not guaranteed to be 100% accurate. Original Images and PDF's are included on every page for reference.

Why did you do this?

The Mueller Report is one of the most important documents in American History. We've made attempts to make the document more accessible, interesting and available for the average reader.

OPEN Mueller Report